Abstract-This letter investigates the secrecy performance of a visible light communication (VLC) system with a legitimate receiver and a group of eavesdroppers. Considering the randomness of the locations of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers, the statistical characteristics of the signal-to-noise ratio over the VLC downlinks are characterized; then, we derive the closed-form analytical expressions for secrecy outage probability and the average secrecy capacity by using stochastic geometry method. Finally, simulations are carried on to verify our proposed analytical models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
N OWADAYS, as an effective complement to conventional radio frequency communications, visible light communications (VLC) has been regarded as a promising solution to fulfill the ever-increasing demand for wireless services and to enable seamless wireless experiences, since it may only require the existing illumination infrastructure, i.e., light emitting diodes for the purposes of wireless data delivery [1] .
There is a growing literature presented to study VLC system in terms of channel modeling [2] , hardware design [3] , modulation scheme [4] , performance modeling [5] and transmission scheme design [6] .
In spite of line of sight propagation and better signal confinement, the information transmission over VLC channels is probably eavesdropped by unintended or unauthorized users. It is due to the inherent broadcast nature of VLC channels, over which light signals are transmitted without optical fibers or any sort of wave-guiding. Therefore, physicallayer (PHY) security has emerged as a promising method to protect information delivery from eavesdropping [7] . In [8] , a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the single-input single-output (SISO) channel was derived. The authors of [9] analyzed the upper and lower bounds for the SISO VLC secret-key capacities, as well as the analysis of an MISO VLC secret-key transmission strategy. Transmit beamforming and jamming techniques were employed to enhance the secrecy for a multiple-input single-output VLC system in presence of multiple eavesdroppers [10] .
Then, it is easy to find that the PHY security of VLC system has not been well exploited and still remains an open issue, as no closed-form expressions have been proposed for VLC systems, especially while considering the randomness of the terminals' positions.
Motivated by the above observations, in this letter, making use of stochastic geometry theory, we study the secrecy performance of a VLC system with a legitimate receiver and a group of eavesdroppers, while considering the randomness of the locations of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers. The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
• We characterize the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the signalto-noise-ratio (SNR) over the VLC links.
• The closed-form analytical expressions for secrecy outage probability (SOP) and the average secrecy capacity (ASC) have been derived.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider a VLC system, as shown in Fig. 1 , where a group of L (L ≥ 1) light-emitting diode (LED) lamps is placed in the center of the ceiling to ensure the illumination and to deliver data to a legitimate receiver. Furthermore, there are also a group of eavesdroppers locating in the same area and trying to eavesdrop the information transmission between the LED lamps and the legitimate receiver. Moreover, the legitimate receiver and eavesdroppers are with photodiode (PD) for the purposes of data communication.
For tractability purpose, in this work we also treat the ground floor of the room as a circle, S, with radius, D, where the projection of the LED lamps is located at the central of the circle. Without loss generality, we assume that the legitimate receivers are uniformly distributed in the circle, S, denoted by W . Also, the location of the eavesdroppers is modeled as a homogeneous Poisson Point process (PPP) with density λ. The number of the eavesdropping receivers, which denoted by
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projection of the LED can be calculated from W , the PDF of which can be given as
In the following, we name the legitimate receiver as the 0th receiver to facilitate the analysis.
There is a line of sight (LoS) path from the LED to each node, and also a diffuse path via the reflections from surfaces within the room. In this work, we only consider LoS propagation and ignore reflections from surrounding surfaces. The channel gain from the transmitter to the receiver is given by [11] 
where d is the distance between the LED lamp and the receiver, A is the area of the photodetector, φ is the transmitter viewing angle (also referred as irradiation angle), ψ is the angle of incidence with respect to the receiver axis, c is the concentrator field of view, T s (ψ) denotes the gain of the optical filter adopted at the receiver, m denotes the order of Lambertian emission, which is related to φ 1/2 (the semi-angle of the LED), the transmitter semi-angle (at half power), by m = − ln 2/ ln cos φ 1/2 , g (ψ) denotes the gain of the non-imaging concentrator, which is given by [11, eq. (8) ].
In this work, it is assumed that the average optical transmit power (P t ) and the area of the photodetector at all LED lamps are same. Then, the received optical power from the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ L) LED lamp at the j th (0 ≤ j ≤ N), where 0 denotes the legitimate receiver) receiver can be given as
where h i j , m i , φ i j , ψ i j and d j are the parameters defined in (1) for the i th lamp and the j th receiver. It is obvious that P i j R is not only related to the distance between the i th lamp and the j th receiver, but also related to both the radiation pattern of the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ L) lamp and the incidence angle of the j th receiver. As suggested by [12, eq. (11) ], the RF power from the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ L) lamp at the j th (0 ≤ j ≤ N) receiver can be written as
where C j,R F is the RF power constant at the j th receiver, which is related to the optical-to-electrical conversion efficiency and optical power constant given the following relation P j,R F 1 2 ∝ i P Dj ∝ P r j (i P Dj is the current of the PD at the j th receiver), G t φ i j and G r ψ i j are the transmitting and receiving gains with the radiation angle φ i j and incidence angle ψ i j , respectively, which can be given as G t φ i j = cos m i,t φ i j and G r ψ i j = cos m i j,r ψ i j , where m i,t and m i j,r are related to φ i,1/2 and ψ i j,1/2 , which are the i th lamp and the j th receiver semi-angles at half power, and are given by m i,t = − ln 2/ ln cos φ i,1/2 and m i j,r = − ln 2/ ln cos ψ i j,1/2 , respectively.
In the following, we assume that the incidence line is perpendicular to the PD axis at each receiver to maximize the light receiving. Then, it deduces
the analysis, as all LED lamps are close to each other. Therefore, (3) can be rewritten as
Observing Fig. 1 , one has cos φ j = H / H 2 + r 2 j and
. In this work, we ignore the amplitude constraints and assume Gaussian input distribution for simplicity. Then, the received SNR at the j th (0 ≤ j ≤ N) receiver can be written as
where N 0, j is the power of the noise at the j th receiver,
In the following, we use γ j instead of γ i j for simplification. Therefore, the instantaneous secrecy capacity can be presented as (6) where γ max = max
Then, the PDF of r j (0 ≤ j ≤ N) can be obtained as (8) and
respectively, where
We can write the PDF of γ max = max
where III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY In this letter, SOP is defined as the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is below a threshold secrecy rate, C th (C th ≥ 0). Then, SOP can be written as
where ν = 2 C th .
To simplify the analysis, we define a function f (C th , κ) =
As the main and eavesdropping channels are independent with each other, using [13, eq. (3.197.8 )], we can calculate f (C th , κ) as Then, SO P (C th ) can be written as
IV. THE AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY The ASC can be given bȳ
where f (γ 0 , γ max ) is the joint PDF.
As the main and eavesdropping channels are independent with each other, we rewrite ASC as
f γ max (y) dydx and
Using [14, eq. (11)], we can obtain
where
is the Meijer's G-function, as defined by [13, eq. (9. 301) in [13] .
To facilitate the analysis, we define a new function g (y) 
Using (17) in (16), we can easily writeC s1 as Similarly, we can writeC s2 as
Then, using (17) in (19), we finally deriveC s2 as
Therefore, ASC can be obtained by substituting (18) and (20) Because increasing λ and D will bring more eavesdroppers, resulting in the increased diversity gain for information eavesdropping. One can observe from Fig. 3 that, when λ decreases or D increases, ASC can be improved in the low λ region and degrades in high λ region. This can be explained by the fact that lower λ and larger D mean the probability that the distance between the center of the circle S and the legitimate receiver is shorter than the ones among the center of the circle S and the eavesdroppers gets larger, which leads to poor eavesdropping. It is exactly opposite for ASC in the higher λ and lower D region. Moreover, it is obvious that simulation and numerical results match well with each other, which verify our proposed analytical models. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we have studied the secrecy performance of a downlink VLC system and derived the closed-form analytical expressions for both SOP and ASC, while considering the randomness of the positions of the receivers. Numerical results reveal that the density of the eavesdroppers has a negative effect on SOP, and the radius of the circle has a positive effect on ASC when the density of the eavesdroppers is low, and vice ver sa when the density of the eavesdroppers is high.
